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ARE PERFORMANCE RATINGS REVEALED TO PEERS? 
Chapter I 
Problem Statement 
In the Corporate Engineering Division of Phillips Petroleum Company we use 
performance appraisals for two conflicting purposes, appraisal for reward 
purposes and appraisal for counseling purposes. On the one hand, an employee 
wants to look as good as possible in order to maximize his entrinsic rewards, 
while on the other he wants accurate and helpful feedback about his perfor-
mance. For the basis of making raise and promotion decisions, all employees 
in a particular group are force rated superior, highly competent, proficient 
plus, proficient, or improvement required. The Human Resources Group forces 
each group to include certain percentages in each rating category to keep 
groups from rating all their people highly. Each employee's salary is 
compared to others in the same job grade to determine which quadrant their 
salary places them. These two pieces of information, rating and quadrant are 
then used to determine the percentage. Employees in the lower quadrants of 
the salary grade receive larger percentage raises than those in the upper 
quadrants with the same rating. Obviously higher ratings also lead to higher 
percentage raises. In the last few years, Corporate Engineering has become 
more open in revealing how this system of salary administration works. In 
fact, last year, most employees were shown the rating/quadrant matrix that 
determined their percentage raise. At that time, the employees saw how much 
variation was possible in their raise and the raises of others by the combin-
ation of quadrants and ratings. Therefore an increase in rating could be 
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translated into dollars for a particular employee who might then be more or 
less highly motivated. 
Are Engineers, as professional employees, concerned about fairness or justice? 
As an employee in a work organization, one of the types of behavior engaged in 
is comparison with others in the organization. One comparison often made is 
your pay and your inputs to the organization with the same ratio of another 
relevant person. There are several theories such as dissonance theory, equity 
theory, social comparison theory, exchange theory, and expectancy theory that 
attempt to explain human behavior and distributive justice. Distributive 
justice has to do with the allocation of rewards and penalties according to 
merit. If you perceive that inequity exists, equity theory holds that you 
will be motivated to engage in behavior to reduce the inequity. With 
Corporate Engineering's more open salary administration policy, employees 
sharing information can make personal analysis of equity easier, without 
sharing actual salaries. The research question is whether performance ratings 
of Engineers are revealed to their peers. 
From this study it is hoped to determine whether any particular group of 
Engineers is more likely to reveal performance ratings to peers. The results 
of this study may have 
Engineering. A serious 
some implications for the management of Corporate 
drawback to distributing information about raise 
percentages is the friction that seems to result from such disclosures. 
Though management may be prepared to defend its overall program, it often has 
difficulty justifying the legitimacy of minor differentials among employees. 
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This may be especially true in a forced ranking situation where there are very 
small differences between employees, but a dividing line drawn between two 
ratings may result in several percentage points difference in raises. 
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The process of performance appraisal is the continuous evaluation of the 
contribution of individuals and groups within the organization. Such 
evaluations are constantly being made for a variety of purposes, including 
selection, correction, training, pay increases, promotions, discipline, and 
transfers. Appraisals may vary from highly subjective, almost subconscious 
evaluations to highly systemized reviews focusing on specific behavior. 
Probably no other area of management is so fraught with anxiety on the part of 
both supervisors and subordinates and has so much potential for either 
positive or negative consequences in terms of morale, motivation, and 
development. 
A large majority of industrial organizations use systematic performance 
appraisal procedures for both nonsupervisory and managerial employees. 
Nonindustrial organizations, including branches of the military services, 
government, hospitals, and universities, also make extensive use of such 
plans. Surveys typically indicate more use of formal performance appraisal 
procedures for midlevel managers, supervisors, and nonexempt white-collar 
employees than for blue-collar workers. The lesser incidence with blue-collar 
workers undoubtedly reflects the widespread practice of paying production and 
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maintenance workers straight hourly rates or using rate ranges through which 
they progress based on length of service. The most common interval between 
formal ratings as indicated in these studies was one year. The second most 
frequent interval was six months. While in a high proportion of firms 
appraisal results were discussed with the employee, most firms did not report 
feedback and discussion as a primary purpose of the appraisal. 
There are numerous devices used in traditional performance appraisal. The 
graphic rating-scale method, also called the "chart method" is the most 
frequently used. With this method the rater places a check mark on a form 
next to the word or phrase describing the degree of merit for each of several 
traits such as quality of work, quantity of work, cooperation, and so forth. 
Degrees of merit might run from inadequate to superior, or below average to 
above average. A major problem with graphic rating scales is that words like 
superior, average, and the like mean different things to different people. 
The traits themselves such as loyalty and cooperation are also subject to 
different interpretations. Another device in performance appraisal is the 
rank-order method, in which a supervisor ranks all employees from best to 
poorest in one or more traits. If groups differ in size, statistical 
corrections need to be made to compare the relative standing of individuals in 
one group with that of individuals in another group. Another difficulty is 
that the distance in performance between two people tends to be obscured. 
Another rating technique is the forced-distribution method, in which the 
individuals rate are distributed along one or more scales and fixed 
percentages of employees are assigned to the best and worst ends of the scale 
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and to the middle bracket. This method is similar to the teaching technique 
of grading on the curve. Another device is the paired comparison method in 
which, for each trafr to be considered, every subordinate is compared with 
every other subordinate. When the number of favorable choices is tallied for 
each individual, the method then reveals itself to be a detailed-ranking 
method. In this method, only two individuals are considered at one time, 
which presumably makes choice easier and more accurate. One difficulty is the 
number of comparisons increases geometrically as the size of the group to be 
rated increases. The critical-incident technique involves keeping a record of 
unusually good or undesirable incidents occurring in an employee's work and 
provides a factual record for subsequent discussions and decision making. One 
drawback in this method is the possibility that the supervisor may accumulate 
a number of bad incidents, unload them on subordinates at six-month or one-
year intervals, and neglect to discuss them at the time of occurrence, when 
discussion would be the most meaningful. The forced-choice rating method 
features a series of descriptive statements in sets of four, with the rater 
choosing the most descriptive and least descriptive statements from each set. 
This method appears to minimize both the problem of the halo effect and the 
problem of different interpretation of the meaning of points on trait-scales. 
The halo effect, is the tendency for the rater to rate a person high on every 
trait if the person is outstanding in one particularly desirable 
characteristic and to rate the person low on all traits if there is some 
particularly conspicuous undesirable characteristic. 
Both organizations and their employees have certain goals they wish to achieve 
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as a result of performance appraisal. In some cases such objectives are 
compatible, but in other situations they are in conflict. Organizations are 
increasingly becoming.aware that they have to plan and program the development 
of their human resources just as they do their economic resources. Career 
development and assessment are the most frequent purposes for which appraisal 
is done. People have to be prepared to fill the many expected and unexpectefl 
job vacancies that are constantly occurring in organizations. Not having 
someone ready to fill in important job can be just as costly as not having the 
money to expand the organization's physical plant. Data from the performance 
evaluation system can help to pinpoint who might be good candidates for 
development and just what kind of development experiences might be best for 
them. The performance appraisal process is often used by organizations as a 
way of influencing intrinsic and extrinsic work motivation. The manner in 
which valued rewards are given has an important influence on motivation. The 
giving of such rewards as promotion and pay increases is often tied to the 
results of performance appraisal sessions in the hope of creating the belief 
that good performance leads to desired rewards. 
Some performance appraisal sessions also include goal setting on the part of 
the subordinates, a process also designed to motivate behavior. Both the 
training and motivation functions of the performance appraisal process are 
important, but can conflict with each other. Appraisal for motivation tends 
to focus on the objective evaluation of the employee in relation to other 
employees. Appraisal for development tends to focus on strong and weak spots 
of performance from the point of view of how overall performance can be 
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improved and what the implications are for the employee's career. In addition 
to calling for different discussion emphasis, appraisal for reward purposes 
and appraisal for counseling purposes produce different, somewhat competing 
motivations in the individual who is being appraised. 
The individual also has certain goals for the performance evaluation process. 
A number of social psychological theories have pointed out that individuals 
want to seek out feedback about their performance since it helps them learn 
more about themse 1 ves. If their performance compares favorably with others, 
then people tend to satisfy their needs for competence and psychological 
success; if it does not, they tend to experience failure, and the feedback is 
often difficult to accept. When the performance evaluation process is crucial 
in determining the extrinsic rewards an individual will receive, employees 
have a very direct reason for wanting to be favorably evaluated. The 
individual very naturally tries to present his performance in the best light 
in order to obtain the valued rewards that led him to join the organization in 
the first place. Thus, in the performance evaluation situation the individual 
often has conflicting objectives. On the one hand, he wants to look as good 
as possible in order to maximize his extrinsic rewards, while on the other he 
wants accurate and helpful feedback about his performance. 
Although most rating systems involve superiors rating subordinates, and most 
people probably prefer this arrangement, peer ratings and subordinate ratings 
have been used with effectiveness in a few situations. The greatest use of 
the peer-rating technique seems to have occurred in research about military 
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organizations, although there has been some actual use of such ratings in 
assigning people to military combat teams, in selecting supervisors in 
industry, and in assisting supervisors to improve their performance. Ratings 
of supervisors by their subordinates have been used in industry to assist 
managers in improving their own performance. Students' ratings are also used 
in universities to assist professors in improving lectures and course content. 
Probably the major problem in the use of peer or subordinate ratings is the 
potential danger that the ratings may be made on the basis of performance that 
is useful to the rater but not necessarily to the enterprise. There is some 
evidence that subordinates prefer a different pattern of behavior from 
supervisors than is expected by the supervisor's superiors. Thus, management 
must be cautious of interpreting the results of peer and subordinate ratings 
and not abdicate decision making to subordinates. Distortion of true 
judgments are probably greatest when peer and subordinate ratings are used for 
decisions on pay increases and/or promotions, since these decisions can have 
an effect on the rater. For example, a person might rate a peer lower than 
warranted if one thought a higher rating might reduce one's own pay increase. 
However, there is also some evidence that peers may not distort peer ratings, 
at least when rating colleagues for possible promotion. In a study made in 
three insurance companies, agents were told that the results of peer ratings 
might be used administratively as one part of the overall process of assistant 
manager selection, yet the results were predictive of future managerial 
success in all three companies. 
The work effectiveness of any individual can be evaluated from two 
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perspectives. It can be looked at in terms of the activities the person 
performs and the inputs he makes, and it can be looked at in terms of the 
results of that activity or the outcome it produces. Performance evaluation 
systems can and do focus on only results, only activities, or some combination 
of the two. The research evidence on performance evaluation suggests that 
focusing on results produces quite a different impact than focusing on 
activities or on a combination of the two. Focusing on either activities or 
results to the exclusion of the other produces undesirable consequences 
because it causes individuals to emphasize that which is measured to the 
exclusion of that which is not measured. For example, salesmen who are 
evaluated on the basis of sales results sometimes get their sales in ways that 
produce customer ill will and that lead to high costs. A system which 
focusses on results also often fails to provide the type of data which is 
needed to counsel and develop individuals. For this to be done effectively 
information is needed on why the person did or did not achieve the desired 
results. An appraisal approach which measures only the activities the person 
engages in and how they are engaged in obviously fails on a number of counts. 
It tends to motivate activities rather than accomplishment. For example, a 
system which measures salesmen only on how many calls they make and how polite 
they are is likely to motivate the salesmen to be very courteous and to make a 
high rate of calls, but it may not motivate them to sell. In some jobs it is 
difficult to measure results in a quantifiable, objective way. In some jobs 
it is difficult to measure activities, particularly from the point of view of 
how they are carried out. 
end up being subjective. 
Inevitably the measurement systems which are used 
However, this does not negate the point that both 
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results and activities need to be measured. 
If performance appraisals are either too far apart or too close together, the 
feedback may be meaningless to the person, and the generation of invalid data 
may be encouraged. On any job it takes a certain amount of time for the 
impact of an individual's actions to show up in a measurable form. This fact 
has been utilized to develop a measure labeled "time span of discretion". It 
is defined as the time it takes for substandard performance to show up. In 
some jobs the time span is very short, perhaps only a few minutes, while in 
others it is several years. As might be expected, the time span of discretion 
tends to be much longer for higher-level management jobs than it is for lower-
level jobs. Problems can develop when the time between performance evaluation 
sessions is either much longer or much shorter than is the time span of 
discretion. The feedback can be either premature and inaccurate or so slow 
that it is irrelevant. 
Because both superiors and subordinates have ambivalent attitudes about 
performance appraisal, a phenomenon called the "vanishing performance 
appraisals" occurs in many organizations. When interviewed separately, 
subordinates report that they have not had a performance appraisal session for 
several years, while superiors report they hold regular performance appraisal 
sessions. Further investigation typically reveals that the superiors at some 
point in time have talked in rather general terms with the subordinates about 
their performance. The superiors consider this to be a performance appraisal 
session, but the subordinates do not and wonder why they are not getting the 
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kind of feedback they want. It is not hard to see how this kind of behavior 
on the part of the superiors 
holding these sessions. It 
can occur, given their mixed feelings about 
is also not hard to understand why what 
constitutes an acceptable appraisal session for an anxious superior might not 
provide the kind of information a subordinate wants. 
Assuming the performance of groups to be relatively equal, one problem in 
appraising performance is the tendency of some supervisors to rate their 
people high and other supervisors to rate their particular subordinates low. 
One study of thirty department heads found that four of them rated their 
subordinates so severely that all were rated below the poorest rating made by 
the two most lenient department heads. Other studies have found some 
appraisers to be high differentiators, allocating subordinate ratings across 
most or all the range of scales, and some to be l~w differentiators, using a 
limited range of the scale in differentiating subordinates. This type of 
problem can be partially solved through training, forced distributions, or 
statistical corrections. It is possible for one group to be superior to 
others although the kind of discrepancies described above are not too likely. 
Because of such cases as differences in standards in original selection or 
differences in leadership or motivation, one group may be quite superior to 
another. 
Another problem which can occur in the use of any personnel system is the 
distortions that can occur if the rules of administration require a particular 
course of action for a particular rating. Taking automatic action on the 
- 16 -
basis of a rating without regard to its meaning or without regard to other 
important variables makes appraisal a monster rather than a useful tool. The 
Federal Civil Service discovered this effect soon after the Classification Act 
of 1923 required dismissal if a civil servant's rating fell below "good" on a 
scale of excellent, very good, good, fair, and unsatisfactory. 
consequence, it was rare for any agency to rate anyone below "good". 
As a 
Some of 
the deficiencies of the law were remedied in the Performance Rating Act of 
1950, but ratings still resulted in automatic consequences. Since the law 
required a minimum of three levels outstanding, satisfactory, and 
unsatisfactory - and required that all aspects of an employee's performance 
must be outstanding in order to receive an outstanding ranking and that 
discharge was mandatory in the case of an unsatisfactory ranking, 99 percent 
of the employees were rated satisfactory. 
A particularly serious problem with rating techniq~es such as the rank-order, 
forced distribution, and paired comparison methods is that they create a kind 
of "zero-sum" climate in the organization. In this atmosphere, both managers 
and subordinates feel trapped in a world in which half of the people are below 
average and if one person rises to the above average category, it is at the 
expense of someone whose ranking must fall. Thus the net result is always 
zero. Such zero sum approaches frequently lead to widespread discouragement, 
cynicism, and alienation. Ways out of this dilemma are to focus on a goal or 
results approach, to use many kinds of feedback, and to avoid ranking kinds of 
comparisons. 
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No matter how well defined the dimensions for appraising performance on 
quantitative goals are, judgements on performance are usually subjective and 
impressionistic. Because appraisals provide inadequate information about the 
subtleties of performance, managers using them to compare employees for the 
purposes of determining salary increases often make arbitrary judgements. In 
some instances, an individual is informed of his superior's judgement. In 
others, performance appraisal results are withheld. Employees with more 
education, a stronger self-image, and a need to know about their effectiveness 
and their future will seek out information about themselves and their roles in 
the organization not only from their managers but from others in a position to 
observe, assess, and guide their behavior. An employee's peers will, in many 
cases, represent a credible source of feedback because of their frequent 
contacts and their interdependence among one another for accomplishing goals. 
Feedback from fellow team members will be critical in some caes, because peer 
pressure in a shared assignment can be a very powerful source. 
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Wage Administration 
Once work effectiveness is evaluated, then it can be rewarded. This leads, in 
turn, to one of the most important features of work organizations, the power 
they have to give individuals extrinsic rewards. The rewards are allocated to 
individuals by organizations for many reasons and in different ways, often on 
the basis of the results of performance evaluations. In general, wage 
payments within the organization are determined by a flow of events including 
job analysis, writing of job descriptions, job specifications, job evaluation, 
surveys of wages and salaries, analysis of relevant organizational problems, 
structuring of wages, establishing rules for administering wages, and finally 
wage payments to individual employees. Decisions about the actual structure 
of wages and salaries are typically made after the relative worth of jobs has 
been decided (job evaluation), after prevailing wages and salary practices 
have been ascertained (surveys), and after rel avant organizational problems 
have been considered. Several decisions must then be made, including (a) 
whether the organization wishes or is able to pay amounts above, below, or 
equal to the averages in the community or industry; (b) whether wage ranges 
should provide for merit increases or whether there should be single rates; 
(c) the number and width of pay grades and extent of overlap; (d) which jobs 
are to be placed in each of the pay grades; (e) the actual dollar amounts to 
be assigned to various pay grades; ( f) differentials between pay plans; and 
(g) what to do with salaries that are out of line once these decisions have 
been made. 
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Numerous dimensions or problems must be considered in establishing the wage 
structure in addition to the results of job evaluation and wage surveys. For 
example, are there well established and well-accepted relationships among 
certain jobs that would be upset by job evaluation? Or is the lack of job 
evaluation perpetuating discrimination against women? Using the revised 
structure, will the organization be able to recruit new employees? Are there 
certain skills in such short supply that the prevailing rates in the community 
or industry are not consistent with the results of job evaluation? What if 
job evaluation shows that certain jobs are underpaid compared to others, but 
the labor market makes it relatively easy to recruit people into these jobs 
anyway? What pressures will be brought to bear on the employer if job 
evaluation results in certain jobs being paid significantly more than going 
community rates? What will happen to the wages of employees found to be 
overpaid through job evaluation? What should be the relationship between the 
wage structure and the fringe-benefit structure? These and other problems 
must be considered in establishing the wage structure of an organization. 
Significant differences in salary between subordinates and superiors is common 
practice. One study reports typical differentials between rank-and-file jobs 
and supervisory jobs ranging from 15 to 25 percent. Appropriate differentials 
must be maintained between the exempt and nonexempt groups. Through lack of 
attention, inadequate differentials between this group and the nonexempt 
employees may develop, thus producing serious morale problems for the exempt 
employees. A particularly difficult problem arises when scientists or 
erigineers work under the supervision of nonscientists. Competition in the 
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labor market has sometimes tended to force salaries of technical employees 
upward at a faster rate than managerial salaries in general, and drastic 
narrowing of differentials and sometimes reversals, have occurred in many 
companies. Because of the continuous rise in wage and salary levels 
experienced in this country, a rise resulting from a variety of environmental 
pressures, considerable thought must be given to handling upward changes in 
the wage and salary structure. Since most employees recognize the gradual 
upward movement of wage and salary levels, the wisest course seems to be to 
identify general adjustments clearly and not attempt to disguise them as merit 
increases. 
Other uses of administration need to be developed in addition to rules 
pertaining to general adjustments, underpaid and overpaid employees, and 
differentials between subordinates and superiors. For example, it must be 
determined to what degree advancement will be based on length of service 
rather than merit, with what frequency pay increase will be awarded, how 
control over wage and salary costs can be maintained, and what rules will 
govern promotion from one pay grade to another. One of the difficulties in 
wage administration is the problem of relating merit, rating decisions· to 
actual dollar increases. Although some companies have attempted to relate 
merit rating to pay increases on a mathematical basis, procedures allowing for 
more judgement about specific situations are probably wiser. Another problem 
arises from a change in wage and salary practices and structure that affects 
the relative wages of employees. What should be done about individual 
employees who appear to be overpaid or underpaid after such a change? Typical 
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practice is to avoid reducing any salaries but to withhold general adjustments 
or merit increases until the company's pay structure catches up with the 
employee's rate of pay through inflationary pressures on overall wage levels. 
In contrast, typical practice when employees are found to be underpaid after 
job evaluation is to bring their salaries quickly up to the appropriate rate. 
Additional administrative rules are needed for handling promotions and 
demotions from one grade to another or from one pay plan to another. Since 
managers are tempted to exert pressure to obtain more money for persons who 
have reached the top of a pay range, partcularly long-service employees, 
control must be maintained to resist such pressures, or else, people are moved 
into higher pay brackets when there has been no genuine promotion. Such 
practices tend to subvent the meaning and usefulness of job evaluation, and 
salaries begin to reflect age or length of service instead of worth to the 
organization. 
Many firms use a device called the maturity curve in salary administration 
programs pertaining to engineers and scientists, which either supplement or 
replaces job descriptions, job evaluations, and pay ranges. Its most 
widespread use is in making comparisons with other companies. This device is 
simply a graph that plots salaries against age or against years of relevant 
experience. No doubt .the assumption that age and years of experience are 
correlated with contribution to the enterprise's goals has some validity, but 
the assumption is not always true, and it ignores other, more relevant 
variables, such as drive, intelligence, and judgement. Furthermore, the 
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assumption that performance tapers off and/or that compensation should peak or 
perhaps decline in a person's late forties or early fifties is open to serious 
question. In a study of 2,500 design and development engineers in six 
companies, on the average, performance ratings declined in their early 
thirties and salary increases dropped dramatically at about age thirty-seven. 
An analysis of the relationship between satisfaction and performance in an 
organization can provide some important insights into the effectiveness of its 
reward system. A stong positive relationship between satisfaction and 
performance indicates a reward system that is functioning in a way that 
rewards good performance. On the other hand, a zero relationship or a 
negative one (the best performers are being least satisfied) can indicate that 
turnover in the organization is likely to be centered among the better 
performers rather than the poorer ones. A good strategy is to invest more in 
the good performers in order to hold them in the organization while minimizing 
the investment in the poorer performers. For example, giving essentially 
across-the-board raises does not mean that everyone will be equally satisfied 
with his raise. Quite to the contrary, it means that poor performers will be 
relatively better satisfied than the good performers. Poor performers tend to 
feel they deserve less in the way of rewards, and thus they react more 
favorably to a given pay raise than do good performers. There has been very 
little research on the effectiveness of deferred-compensation and pension 
plans, but it is reasonable to assume that they probably do lock many 
employees into organizations. In some organizations, this is even referred to 
as the golden padlock. The real question from the point of view of 
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organizational effectiveness, however, concerns who is locked in. 
retain only the less effective and less desirable employees. 
They may 
When one 
organization wants a good employee from another organization badly enough, it 
is willing to pay off or buy out any bonuses, retirement, or stock options 
that he might have built up in his current firm. 
There are no magic formulas for converting differences in performance to 
differences in paychecks, and management must consider a variety of factors in 
making such judgements, including the company's ability to pay and labor-
market competition. However, there are those who believe that differentials 
in salary among below average, average, and outstanding performers are 
generally inadequate. One author states that productivity of scientists and 
engineers in governmental research varies by a factor of nearly 100, but their 
compensation varies by a factor of only about 2~. That is, the scientist 
producing 100 times as much as the poorest performer might only make 2~ times 
the salary of the latter. 
The extent to which employees are informed of the details of wage and salary 
programs varies with type of job, with companies, and with aspects of wage 
programs. Although most hourly paid workers are informed through the wage 
contract about the details of wage programs, salaried workers are more likely 
to have information about ranges than about specific salaries. One study of 
fifty-five companies found 95 percent of the firms giving general oral 
explanation of the salary program to the lower or middle-level exempt 
employees. Information conveyed included a statement that there was a job 
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evaluation program, that salaries reflected both the requirements of the job 
and the performance of the employee, that salary surveys were conducted 
periodically, and that individual performance was reviewed regularly. In 71 
percent of the companies, the employee was informed of the maximum salary for 
her or his own position, but usually only upon request. In 85 percent of the 
companies, the employee was informed when at or near the maximum salary he or 
she could expect to earn on the particular job. 
A serious drawback to distribution information about actual salaries paid to 
individuals is the friction that seems to result from such disclosures. 
Though management may be prepared to defend its overall program, it often has 
difficulty justifying the legitimacy of minor differentials among employees. 
Since people are likely to make judgements about their own performance 
compared to that of their peers and these judgements are likely to differ from 
those made by higher management, disagreement over relative ranking is bound 
to occur. Most managements minimize this problem by trying to maintain 
secrecy about salary data. Secrecy becomes a control assumed to reduce the 
time and effort management must spend in dealing with complaints. 
Paradoxically, although one sometimes hear managers complaining that "everyone 
knows what everyone else is making", there seems to be no research that has 
studied the extent of employee's knowledge about specific salaries. Some 
research, however suggests that secrecy about average salaries and ranges in 
the salaries of groups (not actual salaries) may create dissatisfaction rather 
than prevent it. It may also invalidate the potential motivating effects of 
disclosure. A survey of 563 middle and lower managers in seven organizations 
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found that managers tended 1) to underestimate the salaries of their 
superiors, 2) to overestimate the salaries of subordinate levels, and 3) to 
overestimate the salaries of their peers. Associated with these inaccuracies 
in perception was dissatisfaction about the differentials among themselves and 
both superiors and subordinates. Another study queried 575 professional 
employees in an organization and found that only about half were willing to 
have their salaries known to others. This held true by occupational group, by 
self-assessed performance level, and by age. There was some tendency for the 
more highly paid persons to prefer to have salaries kept confidential. 
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EQUITY 
Some insight into the question of the role of pay as an influence on employee 
behavior and job performance is provided by equity theory. As an employee in 
a work organization, one of the types of behavior you engage in is comparing 
yourself with others in the organization. Equity, or more precisely, 
inequity, is a pervasive concern of industry, labor, and government. Yet its 
psychological basis is probably not fully understood. Evidence suggests that 
equity is not merely a matter of getting "a fair day's pay for a fair day's 
work," nor is inequity simply a matter of being underpaid. The fairness of an 
exchange between employee and employer is not usually perceived by the former 
purely and simply as an economic matter. There is an element of relative 
justice involved that supervenes economics and underlies perceptions of equity 
or inequity. 
Whenever two individuals exchange anything, there is the possibility that one 
or both of them will feel that the exchange was inequitable. Such is 
frequently the case when a man exchanges his services for pay. On the man's 
side of the exchange are his education, intelligence, experience, training, 
skill, seniority, age, sex, ethnic background, social status, and, very 
importantly, the effort he expends on the job. Under special circumstances 
other attributes will be relevant: personal appearance or attractiveness, 
health, possession of an automobile, the characteristics of one's spouse, and 
so on. They are what he perceives are his contributions to the exchange, for 
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which he expects a just return. These inputs or investments are as perceived 
by their contributor and are not necessarily isomorphic with those of the 
other party to the. exchange. This suggests two conceptually distinct 
characteristics of inputs, recognition and relevance. Problems of inequity 
arise only if the possessor of the attribute considers it relevant in the 
exchange. On the other side of the exchange are the rewards received by an 
individual for his services. These outcomes, as they will be termed, include 
pay, rewards intrinsic to the job, seniority benefits, fringe benefits, job 
status and status symbols, and a variety of formally and informally sanctioned 
prerequisites. An example of the latter is the right of higher status persons 
to park their cars in privileged locations, or the right to have a walnut 
rather than a metal desk. Seniority, mentioned as an input variable, has 
associated with it a number of benefits such as job security, "bumping" 
privileges, greater fringe benefits, and so on. These benefits are outcomes 
and are distinguished from the temporal aspects of seniority (that is, 
longevity), which are properly inputs. As in the case of job inputs, job 
outcomes are often intercorrelated. For example, greater pay and higher job 
status are likely to go hand in hand. In a manner analogous to inputs, 
outcomes are as perceived, and, again, we should characterize them in terms of 
recognition and relevance. If the recipient or both the recipient and giver 
of an outcome in an exchange recognize its existence, it has the potentially 
of being an outcome psychologically. In classifying some variables as inputs 
and others as outcomes, it is not implied that they are independent, except 
conceptually. Job inputs and outcomes are intercorrelated, but imperfectly 
so. It is because they are imperfectly correlated that we need at all be 
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concerned with job inequity. There exist normative expectations of what 
constitute "fair" correlations between inputs and outcomes. When the 
normative expectations of the person making social comparisons are violated, 
feelings of inequity result. 
Before defining inequity, we introduce two references terms, Person and Other. 
Person is any individual for whom equity or inequity exists. Other is any 
individual or group used by Person as a referent when he makes social 
comparisons of his inputs and outcomes. Other is usually a different 
individual, but may be Person in another job, or even in another social role. 
Thus, for example, Other might be Person in the job he held 6 months earlier, 
in which case he might compare his present and past inputs and outcomes. Or 
Other might be Person in a future job to which he aspires. In such instance 
he would make a comparison of his present inputs and outcomes to his estimates 
of those in the future. 
Using the theoretical model introduced by Festinger in 1957, inequity is 
defined as follows: Inequity exists for Person whenever his perceived job 
inputs and/or outcomes stand psychologically in an obverse relation to what he 
perceives are the inputs and/or outcomes of Other. The first point to note 
about the definition is that it is the perception by Person of his and Other's 
inputs and outcomes that must be dealt with, not necessarily the actual inputs 
and outcomes. The point is important, for, while perception and reality may 
be and often are in close accord, wage administrators are likely to assume an 
identity of the two. Second, if we let A designate Person's inputs and 
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outcomes and let B designate Other's, by "obverse relation" we mean that not A 
follows from B. But it is emphasized that the relation necessary for inequity 
to exist is psychological in character, not logical. Thirdly, is that 
inequity results for Person not only when he is relatively underpaid, but also 
when he is relatively overpaid. It is probable that the thresholds for 
inequity are different in cases of under- and overcompensation. 
In discussing inequity, the focus has been exclusively on Person. In so 
doing, however, we have failed to consider that whenever inequity exists for 
Person, it will also exist for Other, provided their perceptions of inputs and 
outcomes are isomorphic or nearly so. Only when the perceptions or Person and 
Other do not agree, would the inequity be different for each. 
Having defined inequity and specified its antecedents, we may next attend to 
its effects. First, two general postulates, closely following dissonance 
theory: (a) The presence of inequity in Person creates tension in him. The 
tension is proportional to the magnitude of inequity present. (b) The tension 
created in Person will drive him to reduce it. The strength of the drive is 
proportional to the tension created; it is proportional to the magnitude of 
inequity present. In short, the presence of inequity will motivate Person to 
achieve equity or reduce inequity, and the strength of motivation to do so 
will vary directly with the amount of inequity. The question, then, is how 
may Person reduce inequity? The following eight actions proposed by J. Stacy 
Adams enumerate and illustrate the means available to Person when reducing 
inequity. 
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1. Person may increase his inputs if they are low relative to Other's inputs 
and to his own outcomes. If, for example, Person's effort were low 
compared to Other's and to his own pay, he could reduce inequity by 
increasing his effort on the job. This might take the form of Person's 
increasing his productivity or enhancing the quality of his work. If 
inputs other than effort were involved, he could increase his training or 
education. 
instance. 
Some inputs cannot be altered easily-sex and ethnicity, for 
When such inputs are involved, other means of reducing 
inequity must be adopted. 
2. Person may decrease his inputs if they are high relative to Other's 
inputs and to his own outcomes. If Person's effort were high compared to 
Other's and to his own pay, he might reduce his effort and productivity. 
One may speculate that restrictive production practices often observed 
are in fact attempts at reducing inequity. There exists in industry a 
tendency to select and hire personnel with education, intellect, and 
training which are often greater than that required by the job in which 
they are placed. Since it is likely that in many instances the 
comparison persons for these individuals will have lesser inputs and 
greater outcomes, it is evident that some of the newly hired will 
experience feelings of inequity. In consequence, education, intellect, 
and training not readily modified, lowered productivity may be predicted. 
3. Person may increase his outcomes if they are low relative to Other's 
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outcomes and to his own inputs. When Person's pay is low compared to 
Other's and to his expended effort, he may reduce inequity by obtaining a 
wage increase. He could also acquire additional benefits, prequisites, 
or status. 
4. Person may decrease his outcomes if they are high relative to Other's 
outcomes and to his own inputs. This might take the form of Person's 
lowering his pay. Though an improbable mode of reducing inequity, it is 
nevertheless theoretically possible. Although it is usually assumed that 
persons with very high personal incomes are motivated by tax laws to 
donate much to charitable and educational institutions, it is not 
improbable that this behavior on the part of some is motivated as well by 
feelings of inequity. 
5. Persons may "leave the field" when he experiences inequity of any type. 
This may take the form of quitting his job or obtaining a transfer or 
reassignment, or of absenteeism. Leaving the field is perhaps a more 
radical means of coping with inequity, and its adoption will vary not 
only with the magnitude of inequity present, but also with Person's 
tolerance of inequity and his ability to cope with it flexibly. Though 
it has not been demonstrated, there are probably individual differences 
in tolerance and flexibility. 
6. Person may phychologically distort his inputs and outcomes, increasing or 
decreasing them as required. Since most individuals are heavily 
- 32 -
influenced by reality, distortion is generally difficult. It is pretty 
difficult to distort to oneself that one has a BA degree, that one has 
been an accountant for 7 years, and that one's salary is $500 per month, 
for example. However, it is possible to alter the utility of these. One 
can consider the fact that $500 per month will buy all of the essential 
things of life and quite a few luxuries, or conversely, that it will 
never permit one to purchase period furniture or a power cruiser. 
7. Person may increase, decrease, or distort the inputs and outcomes of 
Others, or force Other to leave the field. Basically, these means are 
the same as discussed above, but applied to Other. The direction of 
change in inputs and outcomes would, however, be precisely opposite to 
8. 
changes effected in Person. Thus, for example, if Person's effort were 
too low compared to Other's and to his own pay, he might induce Other to 
decrease his effort instead of increasing his own effort. Or, if he were 
comparatively poorly qualified for his job, he might try to have his 
better qualified colleague fired or transferred. 
Person may change his referent Other when inequity exists. If Person 
were a draftsman working harder, doing better quality work, and being 
paid less than Other at the next board, he might eschew further 
comparisons with Other and pick someone with more nearly the same 
capability and pay. The ease of doing this would vary considerably with 
the ubiquity of Other and with the availability of a substitute having 
some attributes in common with Person. 
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Not all the means of reducing inequity that have been listed will be equally 
satisfactory, and the. adoption of some may result in very unsteady states. 
The nature of the input and outcome discrepancies and environmental 
circumstances may render some means more available than others, as may 
personality characteristics of Person and Other. 
The majority of the research studies on equity theory have focused on pay 
levels as the basic outcome and effort or performance level as the primary 
input factor. In general, the underpayment situation has been supported in 
many of the reported studies. The overpayment situation, however has been 
less supported due to problems of trying to define or operationalize the exact 
meaning of overpayment. Other studies have shown that such demographic 
factors as sex and value systems have affected perceptions of equity. 
Research has also pointed out certain problems or criticisms of equity theory. 
First, in many of the reported studies the reference person has not always 
been classified. This is much less of a problem in laboratory experiments as 
opposed to field studies. In current studies, rather than specifying a 
reference person, the individual is allowed to use an internally derived 
standard of comparison (past experiences, beliefs, and opinions developed over 
time). This helps to alleviate not only the problem of who the reference 
person is, but also the situation of multiple reference persons for multiple 
outcomes. Second is the problem of an over-reliance on laboratory studies to 
test the theory. Issues 
managers become important. 
of generalizations to real-life organizations and 
The few field studies have been quite supportive 
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of inequity (under payment) as being a key predicator of turnover and 
absenteeism. Third, the majority of research generally supports the notions 
concerning underpayment, but supportive overpayment research has not been 
forthcoming. In reality, this probably is not too surprising, how many 
individuals in organizations will admit to being overpaid? If a person 
initially perceives an overpayment situation, the easiest way to reach equity 
is to change the reference standard or person. Finally, the theory has 
focused almost entirely on the outcome of pay. The general orientation of 
contemporary theories of motivation have shown that pay is not the only factor 
that motivates people. 
The effects of age, sex, and perceived qualifications on one's performance 
behavior have all been examined in various studies in the equity research 
literature. An early study by Clark (1958) showed that job status should be 
in line with social status in a supermarket checkout ringer/bundler team or 
inefficiencies resulted. An experiment was designed by Adams and Rosenbaum 
(1962) in which one group of subjects was overcompensated and one was 
equitably compensated. The results showed that the overcompensated group 
completed 42% more work to attempt to reduce the inequity. A study by Day 
(1961) in a laboratory experiment with children who were given training trials 
in which they pushed a plunger mechanism to obtain M&M candies also obtained 
similiar results. After responses had stabilized, 25 M&Ms were received by 
each subject on each of five trials regardless of the pressure exerted. Day's 
data show that a significant number of subjects respond to the increased 
reward by increased pressure on the overrewarded trials. In terms of our 
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theoretical model, the children 
(pressure) and outcomes (M&Ms) 
during the training .trials. 
in Day's study are comparing their inputs 
during the overrewarded trials with those 
In a study by Arrowood (1961), a similiar 
experiment to Adams and Rosenbaum's was used to eliminate the hypothesis that 
the overcompensated group worked harder to protect their jobs because they 
were insecure in the face of their employer's low regard for their 
qualifications. In another study by Adams and Rosenbaum (1962), overpaid 
hourly subjects produced more than their controls and overpaid piecework 
subjects produced less than their controls. 
A study by Leventhal and Lane (1970) examines perceived qualifications and sex 
differences. College students worked with a fictitious partner on a task for 
which their dyad received monetary reward. Subjects were told their 
performance was either superior or inferior to that of their partner and were 
allowed to allocate the reward earned by their group. Males took more than 
half the reward when their performance was superior and less than half when 
their performance was inferior. Females took approximately half the reward 
when their performance was superior and much less than half when their 
performance was inferior. Females with superior performance also tended to 
minimize the difference between their own performance and that of their 
partner. These findings were contrasted with the results from a study of 
children aged 5~ to 6. The children never took less than half when they were 
inferior. The boys took more than the girls when they were superior. 
Therefore the reward allocation responses of subjects with superior 
performance were similar at both age levels, but those of subjects with 
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inferior performance were not. Vinacke and associates indicate that females 
allocate rewards differently than males. They found that females adopted an 
accommodative strategy in their transactions with members of their group. 
Females major concern appeared to be the maintenance of harmonius personal 
relationships in which the welfare of all members was protected. Thus, 
despite considerable differences in members' perceived power, members of all-
female coalitions tended to divide a group prize equally. Male subjects, on 
the other hand, adopted a more exploitive strategy. 
A decision-making simulation concerning a hypothetical subordinate was used by 
Freedman (1979) to investigate the effects of subordinate sex, pay equity, and 
strength of demand on compensation decisions in an organizational setting. 
Results indicated that subjects recommended higher raises for underpaid 
subordinates than for equitably paid subordinates. A triple interaction of 
all three variables was also found. When subordinates were equitably paid, 
sex and strength of demand had no effect on compensation decision. However, 
when subordinates were underpaid, strong demand females received the largest 
raise and females making no demand received the smallest. Underpaid males in 
both demand conditions received a raise less than that of the strong demand 
female, but greater than that of the no-demand female. A study by Taynor 
(1975) indicated that the performance of men and women are not always 
evaluated in the same manner. A woman who performed well in a masculine task 
(Engineering work might be considered as one such task) was seen as more 
deserving of reward than an equally performing man. Contrary to predictions, 
the man was not seen as more deserving of reward than the women in the 
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feminine task situations. 
Ronen (1978) studied -the relationship between job satisfaction and length of 
employment in a particular job. The hypothesis that the change in job 
satisfaction with job seniority resembles a "U" shaped curve was confirmed. 
It was suggested that intrinsic satisfaction is a major contributor to changes 
in the overall satisfaction of employees over time. Herzberg suggested a "U" 
shaped relationship between age and job satisfaction and between 
. 
organizational tenure and job satisfaction. He reasoned that the "newness" of 
a job produces high morale in employees. After the first few years, however, 
due to uncertainty and lack of security, satisfaction drops sharply. It 
begins to climb again as the employee's expectations adapt to a more realistic 
evaluation of the level of rewards that can be attained. March and Simon 
(1958) suggest that workers perceive a decrease in the availability of job 
alternatives as they become older. A number of studies generally show an 
increase in the level of job satisfaction with age. A study by Saleh (1964) 
has shown, however, that the increase in stated job satisfaction does not 
continue until retirement, but rather that it decreases in the terminal 
period, for example the last five years before mandatory retirement. This 
could be explained by the blockage of channels for self actualization and 
psychological growth and was related to the decline in physical health. Any 
relationship found between job satisfaction and age, or organizational tenure, 
may not be directly due to the time variables, but rather to the employee's 
occupational level, as there is consistent evidence of a positive correlation 
between job satisfaction and job level (Porter-Lawler, 1968 and Vroom, 1964). 
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In a survey by Hunt and Paul (1975), of white collar workers, age and tenure 
had positive, linear relationships to overall job satisfaction. Age had a 
stronger relationship with satisfaction in males than tenure, the reverse held 
for females. When six facets of satisfaction were examined, the relationships 
with age and tenure became more complex. This research has highlighted the 
impracticality of attempting to develop a simple statement of the relationship 
between criteria of job satisfaction and employee age and tenure in an 
organization. 
Equity theory provides at least three guidelines for managers to consider. 
First is the emphasis on equitable rewards for employees. When individuals 
believe that they are not being rewarded in an equitable fashion, certain 
morale and productivity problems may arise. Second, the decision concerning 
equity is not made solely on a personal basis but can involve comparison with 
other workers, both within and outside the organization. In other words, it 
is not only important how much an employee is being paid, but how much he or 
she is being paid compared to other employees who have the same or similar 
jobs. 
forms. 
Finally, individual's reaction to inequity can take many different 
Motivated behavior to reduce inequity can include changes in inputs 
and changes in outcomes, with the level or direction depending on whether the 
inequity was perceived to be underpayment or overpayment. Even with the 
inherent criticisms and limitations, equity theory has a certain intuitive 
appeal to managers. 
Each of us has been in a situation in which he believed that the rewards for 
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our efforts had not been adequate, particularly when we compared ourseleves to 
others. Understanding the manner or process in which this inequity is reduced 
is an important skill .for managers to develop. 
-~-
ARE PERFORMANCE RATINGS REVEALED TO PEERS? 
Chapter III 
HYPOTHESES 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether any particular group of 
Engineers is more likely to reveal performance ratings to peers. Are 
Engineers, as professional employees, concerned about equity? If inequity 
exists, equity theory holds that you will be motivated to engage in behavior 
to reduce the inequity. With Corporate Engineering's more open salary 
administration policy, employees sharing information can make personal 
analysis of equity easier, without sharing actual salaries. · One author states 
that productivity of scientists and engineers in governmental research varies 
by a factor of nearly 100, but their compensation varies by a factor of only 
about 2\. That is, the scientist producing 100 times as much as the poorest 
performer might only make 2\ times the salary of the latter. From Stacy 
Adams' eight means available to reduce inequity, we see in item two that some 
newly hired individuals with high education, intellect, and training will 
experience feelings of inequity. From wage administration literature we find 
that there was some tendency for the more highly paid persons to prefer to 
have salaries kept confidential. In a study of 2,500 design and development 
engineers in six companies, on the average, performance ratings declined in 
their early thirties and salary increases dropped dramatically at about age 
thrity-seven. This leads to the first hypothesis; that ratings are revealed 
more by the younger Engineers to their peers than by the more experienced 
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Engineers. Young Engineers 
opportunities for advancement. 
are very concerned about salaries and 
They have high goals and often are very 
idealistic. With the shortage of Engineers a few years ago, 
Engineers were highly recruited and know that their peers were 
the younger 
also highly 
recruited. All of these factors cause the young Engineers to seek feedback 
about their performance. Young Engineers have little experience with the 
performance appraisal system, and therefore will seek out their peers for 
comparison. On the other hand, the experienced Engineers are more financially 
secure, more realistic about their future potential, and know what to expect 
from performance appraisals and salary administration. Experienced Engineers 
are more likely to have large wage differences among peers due to past 
evaluations and have less to gain by revealing their personal rating. 
From performance appraisal literature we find that employees with more 
education, a stronger self-image, and a need to know about their effectiveness 
and their future will seek out information about themselves and their roles in 
the organization not only from their managers but from others in a position to 
observe, assess, and guide their behavior. An employee's peers will, in many 
cases, represent a credible source of feedback because of their frequent 
contacts and their interdependence among one another for accomplishing goals. 
The second hypothesis is that an Engineer that is a Registered Professional 
Engineer will be more likely to reveal rating information than an Engineer who 
is not registered. A Registered Professional Engineer is probably more 
concerned about career development than average or he would not have gone to 
the trouble to take the grueling test to become registered. The test also 
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discourages some less-confident Engineers from even trying to become 
registered. Often the Engineers that get registered are also the same ones 
who are taking additional course work after hours or already have an advanced 
degree. It follows that employees with more education, a stronger self-image, 
and a need to know about their effectiveness and future such as Registered 
Professional Engineers will seek out information about themselves not only 
from their managers, but from others in a position to observe, assess, and 
guide their behavior. A registered Professional Engineer will therefore be 
more likely to reveal rating information to help satisfy his need for equity. 
From the literature review, there was found no reason to indicate the type of 
Engineer or the sex of the Engineer should be differentiated in equity. 
Therefore the third hypothesis is that sex or type of Engineer will show no 
relation with the revealing variable. 
- 43 -
ARE PERFORMARCE RATINGS REVEALED m PEERS? 
Chapter IV 
RESULTS AND .ANALYSIS 
Confidential questionnaires were distributed to 215 employees of Corporate 
Engineering at Phillips Petroleum Company in two locations, the Phillips 
Building, one of several downtown offices in the main complex in Bartlesville, 
Oklahoma, and at the Engineering Design Center, a separate building, west of 
downtown that houses exclusively the Design Division of Corporate Engineering. 
The Phillips building has the majority of the Chemical Engineers, while the 
Design Center has a mixture of Mechanical, Civil, Electrical, and other 
disciplines. A total of 164 questionnaires were returned (76%) with 156 
having a B.S. degree in Engineering. The most common degree was Chemical with 
66, followed by Mechanical-42, Electrical-21, Civil-17, and all others-10. 
Registered Professional Engineers accounted for 61% of the responses. Only 
two questionnaires were returned by females, still an extremely small minority 
of the Engineers in Corporate Engineering. 
The key question of the survey was number 6; did you reveal your performance 
rating to your peers? Only 25 responses or 16% answered this question with a 
yes answer. The general feeling by management that the informal organization 
discusses this highly personal information seems to be unjustified. The 
purpose of this study is to determine whether any particular group of 
Engineers is more likely to reveal performance ratings to peers. Therefore, 
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the responses to the questionnaire of the total group will be compared to the 
responses of those who answered number 6 with a yes answer, revealer. 
Responses used satistically do not always total 156 because some answers were 
left blank, but the entire questionnaire was not discarded. 
To test the hypothesis about question number 6, a nonparametric test of 
significance, the Chi Square Test, will be used. The Chi Square Test is the 
most widely used test for nominal data. The technique is of the goodness-of-
fit type in which we test for significant differences between the observed 
distribution of data among categories and the expected distribution based on 
the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis in each case will be that the 
observed frequency will equal the expected frequency. The greater the 
difference between the observed and expected frequencies, the less the 
probability that these differences can be attributed to chance. The number of 
categories minus one equals the degrees of freedom, d.f. When d.f. = 1, each 
expected frequency should be at least 5 in size. If d.f. is greater than 1, 
then the Chi Square Test should not be used if more than 20 percent of the 
expected frequencies are smaller than 5, or when any expected frequency is 
less than 1. The level of significance alpha, selected for this study is 
0.05, the most connnon level used in behavioral studies. 
The majority of the responses to question 2 or 82% do compare their salary to 
published industry averages. The published data in usually presented by 
degree and by B. S. degree year and often is broken out in a number of 
categories such as region, sex, industry, and amount of supervision. The 
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sources are trade journals or technical societies, such as the American 
Institute of Chemical Engineers. It is no surprise that 96% of the revealers 
also compare their salaries to published industry averages. In general, it 
would appear that Engineers are interested in equity. 
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The most common answer was never, when asked in question 3 whether they 
compared actual dollar salaries with their peers before Corporate Engienering 
become more open in the workings of salary administration. A policy handbook 
from the Design Division of Corporate Engineering states: "NOTE: Company 
policy dictates that you are not to discuss your salary with anyone within 
Phillips Petroleum Company except designated management." In the following 
analysis, the remaining responses were lumped together, once, infrequently, 











Calculated Chi Square= 11.17 
d.f. = 1 alpha= 0.05 
Critical Chi Square= 3.84 









The alternative hypothesis, revealers are more likely to have discussed 
salaries, is supported (although it is by no means proved). It makes sense 
that those who discuss ratings are more likely to have discussed salaries and 
vice-versa. Concern about equity, probably does not appear suddenly. 
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During the time period that Corporate Engineering was becoming more open in 
revealing how the system of salary administration works, 93% of the 











Calculated Chi Square= 24.91 
d.f. = 1 alpha= 0.05 
Critical Chi Square= 3.84 









The alternative hypothesis, revealers are more likely to have discussed 
salaries, is supported. Obviously, the expected frequency to discuss salaries 
is less than five and another statistical test would be more appropriate, but 
the fact remains that only 3 Engineers discussed salaries and did not also 
discuss ratings. 
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Only 92% of the respondents to question 5 knew their performance rating for 
the previous year. This might be a disappointment for management since 
Corporate Engineering. supervisors were required to have their subordinates 
sign their performance rating sheet for the first time. This was another 
feature of the more open policy. All revealers answered yes to this question. 
You have to know your rating before you can reveal it to your peers. The 8% 
who did not know their rating may have transferred to Corporate Engineering 
from some other group or just plain forgot it. 
Some insight about the respondent's perception of equity can be seen from 
question 7. After discussing salaries or ratings, 5 engineers felt better, 2 
engineers felt worse, and 19 felt no change. Therefore, the majority probably 
felt no different about equity. There may be more equity perceived than 
inequity in the rating and salary administration since so few felt worse. 
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The work positions of supervisor and technical ladder are generally engineers 
with more experience. Therefore, a corallary to hypothesis one might be that 
supervisor and technical ladder engineers would be less likely to reveal their 
ratings. 
Supervisors and TPL 










Calculated Chi Square= 3.24 
d.f. = 1 alpha= 0.05 
Critical Chi Square= 3.84 









At a signficance level of 0.05, the null hypothesis should be accepted, that 
there is no relationship. As can be seen, the calculated value is almost 
acceptable, and at an alpha level of 0.10, the critical Chi Square value is 
2. 71. 
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The first hypothesis; that ratings are revealed more by the younger Engineer 
than by the more experienced Engineers in the reasons for requesting 
information on length of time since the B.S. degree in question 9. Hiring of 
Engineers has not followed a smooth curve at Phillips. Economic conditions 
have dictated few young engineers being hired in the last several years. 
There are several periods like this in the company history, followed by the 
hiring of large numbers. This results in age and experience gaps in the 











Calculated Chi Square= 2.28 
d.f. = 1 alpha= 0.05 
Critical Chi Square= 3.84 









A Chi Square analysis was also calculated for all 5 age categories on the 
questionnaire. Again it.was concluded that we have failed to reject the null 
hypothesis. The first hypothesis was not supported. 
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The second hypothesis, that a Registered Professional Engineer would be more 
likely to reveal rating informatin is the reason for asking question 10. 
Registration is not required at Phillips and only a few managers encourage it, 
although the Company does reimburse Engineers for the registration fees. 
PE - Yes 









Calculated Chi Square= 0.25 
d.f. = 1 alpha= 0.05 
Critical Chi Square= 3.84 









It appears there is no relationship between being a Registered Professional 
Engineer and revealing your rating to peers. 
supported. 
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The second hypothesis was not 
The third hypothesis indicates there should be no difference in revealing 
tendencies between types of Engineers. The majority of Engineers answering 
the questionnaire and also employed by Phillips Petroleum Company are Chemical 
Engineers and Mechanical Engineers. For this analysis, all other types of 













Calculated Chi Square= 2.14 
d.f. = 1 alpha= 0.05 
Critical Chi Square= 5.99 











There appears to be no significant relationship between types of Engineers and 
tendency to reveal ratings to peers. The third hypothesis also stated that 
sex of the Engineers should show no relationship with the revealing variable. 
From question 11, there were only 2 females that responded, both were 
revealers in that they answered question number 6 with a yes answer. Because 
there are so few females, we could conclude that this is not a significant 
variable, but more testing would be required for a definite conclusion. 
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Another variable in the questionnaires was the two locations that Corporate 
Engineering uses for employees in Bartlesville. The return address of the 
questionnaire was hand coded in two colors to indicate the source of the 
response. This was done more in the interest of response percentage, but as 





















Calculated Chi Square= 7.21 
d.f. = 1 alpha= 0.05 
Critical Chi Square= 3.84 
Reject Null Hypothesis 
The alternative hypothesis is supported, that Engineers at the Engineering 
Design Center are more likely to reveal their rating to peers. This does not 
support or reject any of the hypothesis. Some situational variable must be 
evidenced. One possible explanation is the isolation of the Design Center 
from the main downtown complex. Another explanation is that the Design Center 
employes almost as many technicians as engineers in the form of draftsmen and 
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engineering technicians, while the downtown engineers are not exposed to very 
many technicians. In any case, additional study would be required to explain 
this finding. 
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ARE PERFORMANCE RATINGS REVEALED TO PEERS? 
Chapter V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Confidential questionnaires were distributed to 215 employees of Corporate 
Engineering at Phillips Petroleum Company at two locations. A total of 164 
questionnaires were returned (76%) with 156 having a B.S. degree in 
Engineering. The key question of the survey was number 6, did you reveal your 
performance rating to your peers? Only 25 responses or 16% answered this 
question with a yes answer, revealers. The purpose of this study is to 
determine whether any particular group of engineers is more likely to reveal 
performance ratings to peers. 
The majority of the responses or 82% to compare their salary to published 
industry averages. Also comparing their salaries to published industry 
averages are 96% of the revealers. It would appear that Engineers are 
interested in equity, but this is not a good predictor of revealers. 
When asked whether they compared actual dollar salaries with their peers 
before Corporate Engineering became more open in the workings of salary 
administration, the most common answer was never. In a Chi Square analysis, 
the null hypothesis was rejected. The alternative hypothesis, revealers are 
more likely to have discussed salaries, is supported. 
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During the time period that Corporate Engineering was becoming more open in 
revealing how the system of salary administration works, 93% of the 
respondents did not compare actual salaries to their peer's. In a Chi Square 
analysis, the null hypothesis was rejected. The alternative hypothesis, 
revealers are more likely to discuss salaries, is again supported. 
engineers discussed salareis and did not discuss ratings. 
Only 3 
Only 92% of the respondents knew their performance rating for the previous 
year. This is somewhat disappointing since supervisors were required to have 
their subordinates sign their performance rating sheet in acknowledgement for 
the first time in Corporate Engineering. All revealers answered yes to this 
question, since they had to know it before they could reveal it. 
Some insight about the respondent's perception of equity can be seen from the 
question about feeling better or worse after revealing. After discussing 
salaries or ratings, 5 engineers felt better, 2 engineers felt worse, and 19 
fe 1 t no change. There may be more equity perceived than inequity in the 
rating and salary administration since so few felt worse. 
The work positions of supervisor and technical ladder are generally engineers 
with more experience. Therefore, a corallary ~o hypothesis one might be that 
supervisors and technical ladder engineers would be less likely to reveal 
their ratings. In a Chi Square analysis, the null hypotheses was accepted, 
and the corallary was rejected. 
- 57 -
The first hypothesis is that ratings 
engineers than by the more experienced 
failed to reject the null hypothesis 
supported. 
are revealed more by the younger 
engineers. A Chi Square analysis 
and the first hypothesis was not 
The second hypothesis is that a Registered Professional Engineer would be more 
likely to reveal rating information. The second hypothesis was not supported 
by a Chi Square analysis. 
The third hypothesis is that there should be no difference in revealing 
tendencies between types of engineer or sex. A Chi Square analysis supported 
the hypothesis that there is no relationship between types of engineers and 
the tendency to reveal. There were only 2 females that responded to the 
questionnaire, both revealers. Because there are so few females, more testing 
would be required for a definite conclusion. 
Another variable in the study was the two locations that the questionnaire was 
distributed. A Chi Square analysis rejected the null hypothesis. The 
alternative hypothesis is supported, that engineers at the Engineering Design 
Center are more likely to reveal their ratings to peers. Additional study 




Adams, J. Stacy, "Toward an Understanding of Inequity" Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology 67: 422-436 (November, 1963). 
Adams, J. Stacy and Rosenbaum, W. B., "The Relationship of Worker Productivity 
to Cognitive Dissonance About Wage Inequities" Journal of Applied 
Psychology 46: 161-4 (1962). 
Albanese, Robert, Management Toward Accountability for Performance, 
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1975) pp 454-7, 467. 
Emory, C. William, Business Research Methods, (Homewood, Illinois: 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1980) pp 405-505. 
Freedman, Sara M., "The Effects of Subordinate Sex, Pay Equity and Strength 
of Demand on Compensation Decisions" Sex Roles 5: 649-658 (1979). 
French, Wendell L., The Personnel Management Process, Fourth Edition 
(Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1978), pp 45, 128 
303-317, 389-421. 
Hinton, B. L., "The Experimental Extension of Equity Theory on to 
Interpersonal and Group Interaction Situations" Organizational Behavior 
and Human Performance 8: 434-449 (1972). 
- 59 -
Hunt, John W. and Saul, Peter N., "The Relationship of Age, Tenure, and Job 
Satisfaction in Males and Females" Academy of Management Journal 18: 
690-702 (1975). 
Leventhal, Gerald L. and Lane, Douglas W., "Sex-Age and Equity Behavior" 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 15: 312-316 (1970). 
Levinson, Harry, "Appraisal of What Performance?", Harvard Business Review 54: 
30-36 (July-August, 1976). 
Middlemist, R. Dennis and Peterson, Richard B., "Test of Equity Theory by 
Controlling for Comparison Co-workers Efforts" Organizational Behavior 
and Human Performance 15: 335-354 (1976). 
Morrison, Ann M. and Kranz, M. Ellen, "Shape of Performance Appraisal in 
the Coming Decade" Personnel 58: 12-22 (July - August, 1981). 
Patz, Alan Lo, "Performance Appraisal: Useful But Still Resisted" 
Harvard Business Review 53: 74-80 (May, 1975). 
Porter, Lyman W., Lawler, Edward E. and Hackman, J. Richard, Behavior in 
Organizations (New York, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1975) 
pp 316-339, 345-366. 
- 60 -
Ronen, Simcha, "Job Satisfaction and the Neglected Variables of Job Seniority" 
Human Relations 31: 297-308 (1978). 
Saleh, S. D. and Otis, J. L., "Age and Level of Job Satisfaction" Personnel 
Psychology, 425-430 (1964). 
Shapiro, H.J., "Job Motivations of Males and Females" Psychological 
Reports 36: 647-654 (1975). 
Szilagyi, Andrew D. and Wallace, Marc J., Organizational Behavior and 
Performance (Santa Monica, California: Goodyear Publishing Company, 
Inc. 1980) pp 120-123. 
Taynor, Janet and Deaux, Kay, "Equity Perceived Sex Differences" Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 32: 381-390 (1975). 
Walster, Elaine; Berscheid, Ellen; and Walster, G. William," New Directions in 












2. Published Data 
3. Before: Actual$ 
4. Actual$ 1983 
5. Know Rating 






































No 131 0 
7. Feelings Better 5 5 
No Charge 19 17 
Worse 2 2 
8. Work Position Supervisor 28 1 
Technical Ladder 16 2 
Rank and File 112 22 
9. Years 0-5 19 4 
5-10 39 9 
10-20 23 4 
20-30 28 4 
30+ 46 4 
10. Professional Engineer Yes 95 14 
No 61 11 
11. Male 154 23 
Female 2 2 
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Questionnaire 
I am conducting a survey about salary administration and performance 
appraisals for an MBA research report. Corporate Engineering supervisors rate 
their subordinates under such categories as superior, highly competent, pro-
ficient plus, proficient, or improvement required. These rating categories 
are part of the forced rankings used in salary administration. In the last 
few years, Corporate Engineering has become more open in revealing how this 
system of salary administration works. From this study, it is hoped to deter-
mine whether performance ratings are revealed by Engineers to their peers. In 
this case, peers are other Engineers of approximately equal standing and 
experience. Your replies will be treated in strict confidence and any publi-
cation will use only statistical totals. Please circle your responses. 
1. Do you have a B.S. degree in Engineering (possibly among other degrees)? 
2. 
Yes No 
A. If so, what is your B.S. degree in? Aeronautical Architectural 
Chemical Civil Electrical Environmental Industrial Mechanical 
Petroleum Structural Other 
B. If not, do not complete the remainder of this questionnaire. 
Do you compare your salary to published industry averages? Yes No 
3. Before Corporate Engineering became more open in the workings of salary 
administration, did you compare actual dollar salaries with your peers? 
Never Once Infrequently Often Always 
4. Did you compare your salary to your peer's salary during 1983? Yes No 
5. Do you know your performance rating for 1982 which was actually rated in 
1983? Yes No 
6. Did you reveal your performance rating for 1982 (rated in 1983) to your 
peers? Yes No 
7. If you did reveal you performance rating and/or salary with one or more 
of your peers during 1983, did you feel better or worse about your 
performance rating or salary? 
Better No Change Worse 
8. What is your present work position? Supervisor 
Rank and File Engineer 
Technical Ladder 
9. How many years since your B.S. degree in Engineering? 0-5 
20-30 30+ 
10. Are you a Registered Professional Engineer (PE)? Yes 
11. Sex? Male Female 
5-10 10-20 
NO 
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